An accused misdemeanant, if convicted, will be branded with the stigma of a criminal record, 19 yet he may not be accorded the full complement of criminal rights.
IL THE CRmEnmAL PROCESS nr CIAos
The following pattern was typical during the riots in Chicago in April, 1968 , following the assassination of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
0
People were arrested in great numbers and brought to detention centers, where they were fingerprinted and processed to discover whether they had a criminal record. Since great numbers of arrests caused a slowdown in the search for records, those arrested remained in the detention centers for at least several hours until the fingerprints and processing came back from headquarters. During this period no further processing occurred. Counsel had trouble finding their clients. Moreover, lawyers, who had no clients but went to the jails because attorneys were needed, were not allowed to enter. At first, there were no bond hearings; or, if there were, they were held in mass; people accused of certain offenses had the same bonds set for them, irrespective of individual circumstances.n drawing the line between petty offenses and serious crimes. 391 U.S. at 161. The state decisions after Duncan which have attempted to draw the line have not been consistent. See United Farm Workers Organizing Com. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968 ) (trial by jury mandatory where maximum penalty was 55 days in jail and $5500 fine); State v. Owens, 102 N.J. Super. 187, 245 A.2d 736 (1968) (1 year sentence and $1000 fine not serious crime); People v. Morgenbesser, 293 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1968 ) (maximum penalty of 1 year, no jury trial required); People v. Bowdoin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Crim. Ct. N.Y.C. 1968 ) (maximum penalty of 1 year is a serious offense). For the effect that Duncan might have on offenses frequently associated with civil disturbances, see note 59 infra and accompanying text.
The decisions are also inconsistent on the issue whether a juvenile offender subject to commitment to a reformatory for several years is entitled to a jury trial under Duncan. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 469-70, 161 N.W.2d 508, 512, 519 (1968) (a) The amount of bail shall be:
Although Illinois statutes provide that counsel may petition for bond reduction hearings,2 there was no opportunity to amass the information from those in custody necessary to support such petitions. In the beginning only lawyers from the Public Defender's Office were allowed in the courtroom. There were not enough attorneys, however, to assure every accused misdemeanant adequate representation. ' Bonds were set high to keep people off the streets and most remained in jail. After several days, when the level of disturbances had diminished, the State's Attorney's Office eased the restrictions on allowing counsel into the detention centers. Also, volunteer counsel were then allowed to interview prisoners who had not contacted them previously. Bond reduction hearings were set for the following day (i.e., seven days after the first arrests) when most arrestees had their bonds reduced24 and were released. Because the preliminary examination 9 is not mandatory in misdemeanor prosecutions in Illinois, 2 most of those arrested .and charged with misdemeanors were released and did not return to court until trial . 7
The administration of justice during the riots in Detroit in the summer of 1967 followed a similar pattern.H People were arrested in groups and 2 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 110-6 (1967) .
2 Other lawyers who were present maintain that retained and volunteer counsel aside from the public defender's office were allowed in the courtrooms at all times. Interview with Mr. James B. Haddad, Assistant State's Attorney. 2 The courts, while reducing the amount of the bonds, refused to release people on their own recognizance, which is statutorily permissible. ILL. Rnv.
STAT., ch. 38, § 110-2 (1967) .
2 See note 10, supra and accompanying text.
6 See note 9, supra. [Vol. 61 'herded into overcrowded and inadequate detention lacilities. Certain functions such as prose'cutorial ,screening were oriented toward mass rather than ,individual justice."' Bail was originally set high and then lowered when disturbances in the streets had calmed down.
3 Counsel were not permitted to -see prisoners unless they knew their names. When volunteer counsel were allowed into jail, their numbers were insufficient to provide individual representation. 1 2 When preliminary examinations -were held, they were often bursory.P It is significant that this pattern apparently did not prevail during the Democratic Convention week in Chicago, August 25-29, 1968 . Although the situation in the streets was chaotic,N there was ample legal representation for all those arrested. Bonds were set at $25 or $50 for misdemeanor charges, and few people spent the night in jail against their will. July, 1967 July, , 66 M&ch. L. R.v. 1542 July, , 1549 July, -50 (1968 It is clear that there is no magic in the designation of a crime as a misdemeanor, or felony. We must look to the consequences of conviction of crime rather than classification. The impact on an accused who suffers loss of liberty by-incarceration in a penal institution is the same no matter how the crime of which he was convicted was classified. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 399, 154 N.W.2d 888, 895 (1967) . See also Junker, supra note 48, at 687-93. 2Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) .
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A defendant in court on a charge defined as a misdemeanor is as helpless to defend himself as he would be if he were charged with a gross misdemeanor or felony. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 893 (1967).
highly educated.U Furthermore, a misdemeanor charge arising out of a civil disturbance may not be easy to defend at trial. A disorderly conduct charge, for example, is difficult to defend because the statutory language is often vague. 5 Since it seems that in riot situations people are sometimes arrested and charged with disorderly conduct or other misdemeanors just to keep them off the streets,6 there is a real danger that innocent people will be convicted if they are forced to defend themselves without the aid of counsel.
The reasoning in Duncan v. LouisianaU suggeststhat the right to appointed counsel for indigents should be extended to at least some misdemeanor prosecutions. In Duncan, the defendant was convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor under Louisiana law, and sentenced to 60 days in prison and a $150 fine. The maximum sentence for this crime was two years' imprisonment and a $300, fine. Because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be involved,a Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is applicable to all state prosecutions, felony or misdemeanor, except those which are for "petty offenses" as opposed to serious crimes. 
19
As noted above, see note 18 supra, the Court refused to draw the line between petty offenses and serious crimes. The Court did say, however, that "... the penalty authorized for a particular crime is, of major relevance in determining whether it is a serious crime or not and may in itself if severe enough subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 159. In light of the Court's reference to the fact that in the federal system petty offenses are those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine (18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)), and to the fact that most states provide jury trials for offenses punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, it appears that some offenses common to civil disturbances may be included in this test. See, e.g., CAL. rationale of the Court was that the presence of a jury is a valuable safeguard in assuring ihe defendant a fair trial and is fundamental to the American system of justice:
PEN. CODE §
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.... T]he jury trial provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges....
... Our conclusion is that in the American States, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for alldefendants. Since the right to trial by jury has been considered fundamental to a fair trial and accordingly been applied to all serious crimes regardless of their designation as felonies or misdemeanors, it seems that the right of indigents to appointed counsel should also extend to all serious crimes.
It is conceivable that a fair trial may be had before an impartial judge without a jury, but it is hardly conceivable that a person ignorant in the field of law can adequately defend himself without the assistance of counsel-a These considerations, when viewed in light of and $1000 fine); N.Y. PENAL LAW § § 240.05 (riot in the second degree), 240.08 (inciting to riot) (McKinney 1967) (both have maximum penalty of imprisonment for one year).
c" 391 U.S. at 156-58. 61 State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 398, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) . In this case defendant, charged with a misdemeanor, requested the court to appoint counsel for him and the court refused, although defendant claimed he was indigent. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to a $100 fine or 30 days in the county jail. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, not as a matter of constitutional law but rather in the exercise of its supervisory power, that counsel must be provided in any case, felony or misdemeanor, in which the court is empowered to impose a jail sentence, even if the sentence is the alternative, to the payment of a fine, where the defendant is indigent.
Several lower federal court decisions have held the right to dounsel applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions where imprisonment was imposed on sixth amendment grounds. S. 458 (1969) , which seems to hold that an indigent defendant convicted of a petty offense is constitutionally entitled to a free transcript where the state law provides him an appeal as a matter of right. This is a 2-page per curiam opinion, however, with no dissents and one concur-There are difficulties, however, with arguing that equal protection requires appointed counsel for indigent misdemeanants. First, since the equal protection argument can be extended literally to most situations, it is difficult to determine what is actually a deprivation of equal protection. For example, is a state constitutionally required to appoint a psychiatrist for an indigent who wishes to plead insanity? 69 Is it required to pay for a private investigator for an indigent defendant because a more wealthy defendant might have employed one? 70 The provision of either a psychiatrist or a private investigator might affect the outcome of a trial as significantly as might the presence of counsel. Yet, especially in the case of the private investigator,7 it does not seem reasonable to require the state to procure such services for the defendant. The state is financially incapable of eliminating all differences between the rich and the poor.
The second difficulty is that the argument is unnecessary. The constitution has a specific provision covering the point: the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The arguments that the right should apply to state misdemeanants should if possible be based on that provision, rather than on the vague and troublesome Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This approach avoids the difficulties encountered above.
A final argument for applying the right to counsel to misdemeanants is that since the right The main argument against applying the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, as implied above, is that the requirement of appointing counsel for indigents in those cases would place too great a burden on the administration of criminal justice, that too many attorneys would be needed and that the cost to the state would be too great. The Constitution, the argument goes, requires a balancing of the interests of the state and the individual. Since misdemeanors usually carry light penalties, it is claimed that the interest of the accused misdemeanant in having counsel appointed for him is not sufficient to outweigh the interest of the state in preventing the financial expense necessary to provide counsel.
If bar associations were sufficiently mobilized, especially in civil disturbance situations, to effectively cooperate with the courts in providing counsel, the expense should not be overwhelming. Also, it is questionable whether the burden of appointing counsel for all indigent defendants charged with serious misdemeanors would be greater than the burden of providing jury trials for them, which burden did not seem to bother the agree that the bail provision should and will be applied to the states because pretrial detention may prejudice a defendant at trial 6 and because pretrial detention is incarceration' before the determination of guilt, and is therefore inherently, opposed to the fundamentals of the American system of justice.F Most states have the same statutory standards as the federal system concerning the right to bail" and the level at which bail is to be set, 8 but these standards are often disregarded." 0 Under existing standards, there is little justification, even during a civil disturbance, for setting bail at one thousand dollars or more in misdemeanor cases." Since the maximum punishment for most misdemeanors is not heavy, it is doubtful that many accused misdemeanants will jump bail and risk a possibly serious penalty.
2
Even if the accused can afford a lawyer, the tasks of locating witnesses and documenting alibis are time-consuming and costly. The accused misdemeanant may decide that it does not pay to spend several hundred dollars in legal fees to avoid paying a small fine. He should not be put in the position of having either to hire a lawyer or plead guilty. Moreover, aside from the question of finances, pretrial detention may prejudicially affect . 422 (1932) .
"0See notes 119-143 infra and accompanying text. "'Seenote 31 supra and accompanying text. 2 In federal cases the punishment given an accused misdemeanant for jumping bail is a fine up to the maximum provided for such misdemeanor and/or -one year in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1969) . the accused at trial, for witnesses may never be found and alibis may never be able to be docu-
In addition, of course, where it can be shown that the accused is a trustworthy, employed family man, 94 he should be released so that he can earn a living during the pretrial period. Keeping the accused in jail when there is no good reason to do so will only encourage disrespect and contempt for the law, especially among those minority groups that are often involved in civil disturbances.
95
Aside from the amount of bail to be imposed to assure the presence of the accused at trial, there are two key issues concerning the administration of bail. The first is whether the bail system itself is constitutional when applied to indigents; the second is whether a system of pretrial detention should be substituted for or superimposed upon the present bail system. The first issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
9
" Preventive detention, however, must be considered because the considerations relevant to a system of preventive detention are especially prevalent in a civil disorder and because judges sometimes use the present bail system in an attempt to effect the purposes of preventive detention.Y7
It should be noted that most proposals for preventive detention affect only those accused of crimes of violence, such as murder, rape and arson; and those crimes are usually felonies.13 In a civil disorder, however, certain misdemeanors, such as inciting to riot and even disorderly conduct, may 93 See note 104 infra and accompanying text. 1 4 This assumes that the magistrate will take the accused's personal situation into account. Such an assumption may be incorrect when a serious civil disturbance is in progress. See notes 21 and 31 supra.
9-KERER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 352-54.
"8 For thorough discussions of the bail system, see the authorities cited in note 87 supra. The arguments that the bail system is unconstitutional as applied to indigents are that by not being able to post bail and so forced to remain in jail, the indigent is being punished by imprisonment before trial in violation of substantive due process; he is adversely affected at trial and so is deprived of a fair trial in violation of procedural due process; he is denied pretrial liberty only because of his indigence in violation of equal protections requirements; and he is being denied his right to bail 'under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (assuming the Eighth Amendment grants a right to bail and that it applies to the states) because for him, any bail is "excessive." See Foote, supra note 87, at 1135. under some circumstances lead to violence. Therefore, the possibility that the present proposals for a system of preventive detention will be expanded to include certain misdemeanors should not be overlooked.
The argument in favor of preventive detention is that there are certain defendants who constitute such a threat to society that they should not be released at any bail: if released they are likely to commit further crimes or interfere with the processes of justice. A formal preventive detention hearing, it is argued, will give the defendant a chance to clear his name and will be at least as trustworthy and more open than a judge's instinct that a defendant is a threat to the community. In a civil disturbance situation, one's potential for disruption and violence is enhanced and the detention of certain people may help in quelling the disturbance.
10 ' Those opposing preventive detention have advanced numerous arguments. It is difficult if not impossible to establish meaningful standards and criteria for deciding who should be detained. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to predict who will commit a serious crime during the period of pretrial release.io Furthermore, judges almost always overpredict how many are bad risks for releasej" 2 In addition, fact finding takes time, sometimes weeks, during which the accused is incarcerated. Appellate review is, in fact, inadequate and habeas corpus is slow.
Taken together, experience with these comparable proceedings gives no reason for optimism that it would be possible to develop procedures for adequate hearing on preventive detention and administer them with sufficient dispatch to avoid serious complications. July, 1967 , 66 Micn. L. Rxv. 1542 , 1564 -65 (1967 . 101 All of the criteria which might be used as standards for preventive detention share this characteristic of being statistically infrequent. Probably we know least about the degree of probability that a defendant during the period of pretrial release will commit a crime. Here we have no data at all, but it is inconceivable that the probability is higher than five percent and more likely it is considerably lower. The other criteria noted-that the defendant will intimidate witnesses or jurors or injure a complainant-are apparently very rare, statistically well below one percent. Foote, supra note 87, at 1170.
10
2 Id. at 1172.
103 Id. at 1179-80.
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CIVIL DISTURBANCE AND MASS ARRESTS
Finally, pretrial detention, preventive or otherwise, jails one who has not been convicted of a crime and thus impedes the preparation of his defense by restricting his access to his attorney and his ability to track. down witnesses°4 ' Meanwhile earning capacity is cut off, pretrial confinement may break down one's will to resist and innocent people may plead guilty; all this before one is convicted of a crime.
0 5
The arguments against preventive detention are perhaps best expressed by Professor Foote:
The addition of the label "preventive" does not cleanse detention of its vices: pretrial punishment and impairment of a fair trial. The overwhelming objection to such detention is that the kinds of precise prediction of future conduct which it requires cannot be made with significant reliability even under the best of fact finding and diagnostic circumstances. REv. 641, 642 (1964) . These findings provide strong support for the notion that a causal relationship exists between detention and unfavorable disposition .... The results as they now stand ... do add strong support to the argument that pretrial detention increases a defendant's chance of receiving a prison sentence. Id. at 655.
105
Imprisonment to protect society from unpredicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it.... Jackson, J., sitting as Circuit Justice, in Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282.(2d. Cir. 1950) .
106 Foote, supra note 87, at 1182-83. This paper will not attempt to resolve thepreventive detention controversy. It is suggested, however, that the best way to deal with accused misdemeanants'07 is to administer the present bail system fairly.
C. Preliminary Examination
As noted earlier, 0 s an accused misdemeanant may not have a right to a preliminary examination. There is no federal constitutional requirement that such an examination be held.l The question is, therefore, whether an accused misdemeanant should be accorded the right to a preliminary hearing as a matter of state policy" 0 It is arguable that this right ought to be applied to accused misdemeanants as well as accused felons since probable cause must be established in either case." The importance of the preliminary examination is attested to by the fact that in some cases it has been held a "critical stage," making the right to counsel at that time applicable in felony cases."
2 If the danger exists in civil disturbances "... that innocent bystanders will be swept into the process and prosecuted without distinction from those arrested with them.. . ," 11 then in theory it is important that in civil disorders an accused misdemeanant be accorded a preliminary hearing, since the determination of probable cause may not be available through an indictment 4 On the other hand, in civil disorders the preliminary examination is in fact often hurried and not probative and does not afford real protection from mistaken prosecution" 0 In some states it can be adjourned for a certain length of time without the accused's consent, during which time he is either incarcerated or bailed." 0 One's primary con- 
1970]
COMMENT cern after his arrest is to resume his normal life as quickly as possible. Any extra appearance in court will only further restrict his freedom.
The burden on the state in providing preliminary examinations must also be considered. Counsel for the prosecution must be provided. Witnesses for the state often have to testify,"' which in a civil disorder situation means the arresting officer will have to testify. This takes him off the streets. In normal times, it is inconceivable that a state should have to provide a preliminary examination for one charged with a traffic offense: the state would spend more money than it would take in on the ticket.
A distinction might be drawn between petty offenses and serious crimes, as in the jury trial area."' But perhaps the best answer for both the state and the accused is to release the accused on bail, have his lawyer try to negotiate with the prosecuting attorney and in absence of agreement as to plea, proceed directly to trial.
D. Lack of Remedies
It is painfully apparent that in a riot situation, where one's legal rights are violated either before or during his arrest by the police, he may as a practical matter be remediless."' Likewise, where mass processing leads to the violation of one's legal rights after his arrest, he may in fact have no recourse.
As noted above, in many instances judges seem to set bonds high with the express purpose of keeping people off the streets.
2 In fact, during the The problem was to find a way to have the bond reduced before several days had passed. It was difficult to quickly petition for bond reduction hearings because of the early restrictions on counsel allowed in the courtroom and because magistrates were not disposed to hold bond reduction hearings immediately.
2 There were often not enough attorneys to file habeas corpus petitions. When such petitions were filed, the local court often held them for several days before returning them."
8 Where petitions could have been filed in the appellate courts for writs of superintending control,"' lawyers did not file them because they felt they would do no good." The next step was to petition the federal district court for writs of habeas corpus; but federal courts will not grant the writs unless state remedies have been exhausted or unless such remedies are ". . . ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." "' Furthermore, if they had been filed and the exhaustion hurdle had been overcome, the issue might have been moot by the time the federal court was prepared to hear itV 3 0
Since the process of proceeding from one court to another, presenting motions and petitions, attending hearings, and waiting out possible adjournments is apt to be quite time-consuming, the problem during the disorder would have been to obtain adequate review before Obtaining adequate review was almost impossible and the arrestee often remained in jail for a week before the court voluntarily held a bond reduction hearing and reduced the bond. The hearings usually took place after most of the trouble in the streets had subsided." If the accused is subsequently convicted, the fact that bail was refused or excessive will not be grounds for reversal unless he can show not only that his detention was illegal but that he was prejudiced at trial because of it."l As a practical matter this may be impossible to prove,"' especially since trial may not be held for months after the accused is released."' This delay would seem to give a defendant ample time to locate his witnesses, even though because of his detention he may never be able to do so. He will have to prove that it was his illegal detention, and not his own inefficiency, that prevented him from locating his witnesses in light of the fact that he had several months to do so.
Generally a civil action for false imprisonment will lie for unreasonable delay in bringing an arrested person before a magistrate. 38 The action ensure fair justice for all individuals; that communities work out a plan, with all segments of the community participating, for administering during riots, which plan should specify certain police procedures such as alternatives to arrest and should make provision for additional counsel and court personnel; that multiple-use processing forms and station house summonses be used instead of present arrest and processing procedures; that the bar be mobilized to provide adequate representation of riot defendants; that alternative conditions to release be used rather than the present system of setting high bails to keep people off the streets; 45 and that indictments, arraignments and sentencing be conducted on an individual basis rather than in mass.
46
There is a good deal of evidence to substantiate the Commission's conclusion that lack of planning has played an important role in the breakdown of the administration of justice during civil disturbances. Correction facilities were not equipped to handle mass arrests, partly because they are overcrowded even in ordinary times. 4 Police planning was either lacking completely or deficientA Court congestion added to the problem.' 49 There were inadequate numbers of prosecution and defense counsel on hand. 50 Finally, even if there had been adequate planning with respect to one part of the criminal justice system, the system as a whole failed because the parts were not sufficiently coordinated to deal with the great number of arrests.
5
If those responsible for the administration of justice plan their emergency procedures in advance, there would be a greater chance that when the 145 For a short but striking presentation of how bail is set mechanically and used to keep people off the streets, see For the Record-Bail emergency arises justice will be administered in a fair and orderly manner rather than haphazardly and in mass. If such plans were in effect, it seems less likely that courthouses would fall victim to mob psychology and that judges would feel that their primary function in civil disorders is to "keep them off the streets" and do "what the police didn't do." 152 Further legislation and application to misdemeanor prosecutions of constitutional rights will help, but they are not the complete answeri'l What is needed, as the Kerner Commission Report points out, is concentrated, coordinated efforts by legislatures, police administrators, bar associations and courts to assure that justice does not depend upon what is happening in the streets outside. There must be an attempt to conduct business as usual in the courts even if business is far from usual in the streets. The exact procedures to be followed will of course vary according to the logistics of the particular city. The Report therefore gave few details concerning its recommended plan, yet the basic idea of establishing a plan is sound.'
V. CONCLUSION
We are told that due process is the cornerstone of American jurisprudence. Yet while an accused misdemeanant arrested during a civil disturbance sees his rights trampled, he has, in effect, no pretrial or post-trial criminal remedy and whatever civil remedy he might enjoy is almost impossible to realize. Much of the time laws exist to protect his rights. What is needed is a change in attitude on the part of those whose duty it is to enforce and apply the law. Implementations of the recommendations of the Kerner Commission should be a useful first step in changing those attitudes.
"'See note 121 supra and accompanying text. M The state laws regarding bail, for instance, may be quite adequate, but in practice they are sometimes ignored. See notes 119-124 supra and accompanying text.
'
1 Several cities have adopted plans which follow many of the Commission's recommendations. One such city is New York, which has established the Criminal Justice Coordinating Counsel, a multi-agency body. An ad hoc Counsel Committee on the Administration of Justice During Emergency Conditions was formed and made recommendations. Legislation of various kinds was enacted and a plan was developed. The plan is designed to cover arrest and booking procedures; issuance in some cases of station house summonses; simplification of forms; transportation of police and arrestees; dissemination of information concerning the location of arrestees; detention facilities; mobilization of lawyers, judges and non-legal personnel; preliminary hearing; and bail policy and procedures. For a more thorough analysis, see Dodds and Dempsey, supra note 150, at 375-91.
